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Abstract
The knowledge-based rational decision model (KBR-model), developed in [1], of-
fers an approach to rational decision making in a non-probabilistic setting, e.g., in
perfect information games with deterministic payoffs. The KBR-model is an epis-
temically explicit form of standard game-theoretical assumptions, e.g., Harsanyi’s
Maximin Postulate. This model suggests following maximin strategy over all scenar-
ios which the agent considers possible to the best of his knowledge.
In this paper, we compare KBR with other approaches and show that KBR is
the only non-probabilistic decision-making method which is definitive, rational, and
based exclusively on knowledge.
1 Introduction
Suppose A is mission control, and has the option of sending into space a specially trained
astronaut B who, unfortunately, has been exposed to German measles, or a reserve astro-
naut (payoff 1). If B does not get sick, his mission will be a success (payoff 2), otherwise
it will be aborted with failure (payoff 0), cf. Figure 1.
1
•

A
0
•

B
// // 2//
Figure 1: Game One - Apollo 13 Dilemma
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What is a rational way for A to resolve this issue? There are well-known models of deci-
sion making under uncertainty which assume a priori knowledge/belief of the probability
distribution of the consequences of a player’s actions (von Neumann and Morgenstern [21],
Savage [17]). These models seem not to apply to this situation for several reasons. First,
the payoffs of 0, 1, and 2 are ordinal and do not reflect proportional values of these out-
comes to A. What is the montary equivalent of success in a space-race situation if the
mission also has a strong political element? What if it is a high-profile rescue mission?
How disastrous is failure? These are the sorts of questions which do not seem to have
obvious answers within the given framework. The same holds for probabilities: nothing in
the problem description indicates that such probabilities can be assigned responsibly.
With enough good will, Harsanyi’s Maximin Postulate1 of rational behavior can be
applied here:
If you cannot rationally expect more than your maximin payoff, always use a
maximin strategy.
According to our scenario, A can hope, but cannot know for sure, that B does not get
sick and delivers payoff 2. Therefore, A has no reason to “rationally expect” more than
maximin value 1 when moving across, so the rational choice for A is the maximin solution
down2.
1.1 General epistemic approach to games
Epistemic states of players are necessary elements of game analysis. Game theorists have
long considered epistemic conditions under which traditional game-theoretical solutions
hold (cf. [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14] and many others).
In accordance with recent trends in Game Theory, we consider games with arbitrary
epistemic conditions of players. In particular, rationality of a player is not necessarily
assumed to be known to other players. If it is known, then this should be made an explicit
part of the game description.
Games here are presented in extensive finite tree-like form with deterministic payoffs
at their terminal nodes (leaves). Game trees, that includes payoffs, are commonly known
by the players. A game is called generic if there are no indistinguishable payoffs for each
player.
1‘Harsanyi’s postulate’ here means ‘postulate formulated and endorsed by Harsanyi,’ cf. [13] Sections
6.2 and 6.3, Postulate A1. The notion of maximin had appeared, of course, much earlier, e.g. in [20, 21].
2As occurred with Apollo 13.
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1.2 How to play the Centipede game
The starting point of the knowledge-based rational decision model (KBR-model) is the
paradigmatic example of Rosenthal’s Centipede game ([16])3, Figure 2, where we offer an
alternative solution which is much less restrictive and more general than the canonical
backward induction solution (cf. [3, 19]).
Player A makes moves at nodes 1, 3, and 5, player B at nodes 2 and 4. Each player
has the option of moving across or down, with indicated payoffs m,n where m is A’s payoff
and n is the payoff for B. The game starts at node 1.
1, 0
•

1(A)
0, 2
•

2(B)
//
3, 1
•

3(A)
//
2, 4
•

4(B)
//
5, 3
•

5(A)
// // 4, 5//
Figure 2: Centipede game of length 5
The canonical backward induction solution of Centipede is covered by Aumann’s The-
orem on Rationality ([3]) which assumes common knowledge of rationality and predicts
playing down at each node. Indeed, at node 5, player A’s rational choice is down. Player B
is certainly aware of this and, anticipating A’s rationally playing down at 5, would himself
play down at 4. Player A understands this too, and would opt down at 3, etc. This analysis
has been used in textbooks and expository articles as an illustration of Aumann’s Theorem
(cf. [19]).
The question is how to play the Centipede game in a general setting when common
knowledge of rationality is not necessarily assumed. What if players are rational, but
ignorant of each other’s rationality? What if A knows that B is rational, but not vice
versa? There are many meaningful versions of the Centipede game corresponding to dif-
ferent epistemic states of players and the backward induction solution addresses only one,
rather extreme version of this game with the unrealistically strong assumption of common
knowledge of rationality4. Theorem 1 answers this question in full.
For the Centipede game, Theorem 1 looks stronger than Aumann’s Theorem since
Theorem 1 does not require common knowledge of rationality. This may come as a surprise,
but the standard solution down at each node of the Centipede game does not require any
mutual knowledge of rationality at all.
3Rosenthal in [16] introduced Centipede games of arbitrary finite length; we took our formulation of
Centipede from [15]. The Centipede game is defined by some inequalities of preferences and admits different
payoff realizations, all of which reflect the same idea. The game in Figure 2 provides a representative
example of a generic length-5 Centipede game, cf. also [3, 7, 19] for other examples.
4Common knowledge of rationality is rarely met in practice ([3]).
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Theorem 1 [1] In the Centipede game, under any states of players’ knowledge, rational
players play down at each node.
Proof. Theorem holds for Centipede games of any finite length. We will give a proof
for a specific but representative example in Figure 5. This solution can be extended to
Centipede games of any finite length in a straightforward way.
At node 5, player A chooses down.
At node 4, player B’s maximin strategy is to play down. In addition, B cannot know
that A would play across because A in fact plays down5. Therefore, B cannot rationally
expect to get more than his maximin payoff of 4 at node 4 regardless of his knowledge
about A. By Harsanyi’s Maximin Postulate, B chooses maximin strategy down.
At node 3, player A cannot know that B will play across at 4, since B in fact plays
down. Therefore, A cannot rationally expect to exceed his maximin payoff of 3 and hence,
by Harsanyi’s Maximin Postulate, plays down.
Likewise, B plays down at 2 and A plays down at 1. 2
This solution of the Centipede game illuminates a synergy between rationality and
knowledge and hints at a comprehensive theory of knowledge-based rational decisions under
uncertainty which does not rely on probabilistic assumptions.
The Centipede game shows that rationality at each node can lead to strategies which
are bad for all players. Alternative (and better) ways to play the Centipede game are
discussed in Sections 5.3 and 5.4.
2 Rationality
We abstain from giving a comprehensive definition of what is rational, but instead use
natural properties of rationality which follow from common game-theoretical assumptions.
These properties turn out to be sufficient for definitive knowledge-based rational decisions.
2.1 Decisions based on knowledge in non-probabilistic setting
How should Harsanyi’s Maximin Postulate be read within the context of other principles of
rationality, e.g., commonly accepted understanding that rational decisions should be based
on knowledge rather than on luck, guesswork, sudden opponent cooperation or error, divine
intervention, etc.6
If rational decisions should be based on players’ knowledge, the informal notion
to rationally expect a given payoff
5This argument uses the universally accepted factivity of knowledge principle: only true propositions
can be known.
6Unless specifically mentioned in the formulation of a game.
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in Harsanyi’s Maximin Postulate should be read as
to know that you will get a given payoff.
Indeed, if you know that you will get a certain payoff, you rationally expect it
to happen.
Conversely, suppose you don’t know that you will get at least this payoff. Then
for each of your strategies, there are responses by your opponents which you
consider possible to the best of your knowledge, which deny you a given payoff.
It does not then seem rational for you to expect this payoff in a non-probabilistic
setting.
This knowledge-based reading of Harsanyi’s Maximin Postulate is appropriate for games in
which probabilistic assumptions are not part of the picture, e.g., perfect information games
with deterministic payoffs.
When building the theory of knowledge-based rational decisions, we should certainly
take into account another of Harsanyi’s postulates, formulated in [13], the Mutually Ex-
pected Rationality Postulate:
If you are a rational player, you must expect, and act on this expectation, that
other rational players will likewise follow these rationality postulates [which in-
clude Harsanyi’s Maximin Postulate].
Here again we suggest reading
must expect ... that other rational players will likewise follow ...
as
know ... that other rational players will likewise follow ... .
Moreover, traditional game-theoretical reasoning actually uses an iterated form of the Mu-
tually Expected Rationality Postulate which assumes common knowledge of the fact
that rational players follow rationality postulates.
We do not argue that KBR is the only way to play games rationally: traditional game-
theoretical approaches, including probabilistic methods, can be more appropriate for spe-
cific real games (cf. Section 5.4). However, there is a need for a comprehensive mathemati-
cal model of rational non-probabilistic decision making under uncertainty. Theoretically,
KBR covers decision scenarios and games which do not contain probabilistic elements in
their descriptions, e.g., perfect information games with deterministic payoffs. To the extent
that the notion of perfect information game corresponds to reality, KBR theory reflects real
games as well.
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2.2 Highest payoff principle
A na¨ıve, pre-epistemic understanding of rational decisions is that
A rational player chooses a strategy which yields the highest payoff. (1)
This formulation captures the ‘greedy’ element of rationality, i.e., going for the highest
payoff, but totally ignores its epistemic component: as we have already agreed, a rational
player decides not on the basis of what is true in the world, but rather on the basis of
what he knows/believes. In particular, the highest actual payoff associated with a given
strategy can be unknown to the player who, therefore, will not be able to take this payoff
into account. The knowledge requirement naturally leads to the following epistemically
explicit reading of (1):
A rational player chooses a strategy which yields the highest known payoff. (2)
2.3 Knowledge vs. maximin
The question is how (2) corresponds to the aforementioned knowledge-based form of Harsanyi’s
Maximin Postulate that states
If you do not know that you will get more than your maximin payoff, always
use a maximin strategy.
It turns out that the two fundamental elements of rational decision making, knowledge
and maximin, essentially coincide within the standard game-theoretical setting of finite
extensive-form games with deterministic payoffs. In the rest of this section, we will show
that
the maximin solution among all strategies the player deems possible
corresponds to
the highest known payoff to the best of player’s knowledge.
2.4 Highest Known Payoff of a given strategy/move
A strategy for player i is a function that assigns an action (a.k.a. move) to each node of a
game in which i is making a decision. A strategy profile
σ = {σ1, σ2, . . . , σn}
is a collection of strategies σi for players i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Each strategy profile σ uniquely
determines the outcome O(v, σ) associated with a node v and σ: O(v, σ) is the terminal
history (i.e., the sequence of moves by players from v to a terminal node) in which each
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move is made according to σ. Likewise, everyone who knows the game tree can calculate
i’s payoff determined by σ and a node v: Ui(v, σ).
The following observation, first made in [1]7, is the foundation of KBR-theory:
Proposition 1 Let v be a node and i the player who makes a move at v8. Then for every
strategy σi of i, there is a unique Highest Known Payoff, HKPi(v, σi), such that
1. i knows that he gets at least HKPi(v, σi) when playing strategy σi;
2. i does not know whether he gets any payoff greater than HKPi(v, σi).
This is a very generic observation. Indeed, player i knows the finite game tree and hence a
finite set of his payoffs, some of which are known to i as secured when playing strategy σi.
Naturally, there is a highest payoff, HKPi(v, σi), which player i knows he will get when
playing σi from node v.
For example, in the decision making schema in Figure 1, A has two strategies: downA
with payoff 1, or acrossA which passes the choice to B whose intentions are unknown to A.
Under these conditions,
HKPA(A, downA) = 1,
whereas
HKPA(A, acrossA) = 0,
since A considers both strategies by B, acrossB and downB, possible, hence the strategy
profile
{acrossA, downB}
is possible for A and brings A payoff 0. Given strategy acrossA, out of two payoffs, 0 and
2, A knows that he gets at least 0, but does not know whether he gets payoff 2.
The situation is different in Game Two in Figure 3. B is now assumed to be a rational
player who has his own payoffs (coinciding with those of A). Suppose also that A knows
that B is rational.
1, 1
•

A
0, 0
•

B
// // 2, 2//
Figure 3: Game Two
7Strictly speaking, [1] defines HKP for a move, but its extension from moves to strategies is straight-
forward.
8The condition that i makes a move at v is not really necessary.
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Under these assumptions, B would play across seeking payoff 2 for himself (and for A as
well). Moreover, this is now known to A! Therefore, A knows that B will not play down,
hence for A the only possible strategy profile containing acrossA is
{acrossA, acrossB},
with A’s payoff 2. Under these circumstances,
HKPA(A, acrossA) = 2.
In a version of Game Two in which A is not aware of B’s rationality, A considers both
moves by B possible and again HKPA(A, acrossA) = 0.
Theorem 2 HKPi(v, σi) is equal to the minimum of i’s payoffs for all strategy profiles σ
containing σi which are deemed possible by i at v:
HKPi(v, σi) = min{Ui(v, σ) | σ is a possible strategy profile containing σi}.
Proof. To the best of his knowledge, player i considers some strategy profiles possible and
some not. For each strategy σi, and each possible strategy profile σ containing σi, i can
calculate i’s payoff Ui(v, σ) of σ starting from v, hence i can calculate their minimum
m = min{Ui(v, σ) | σ is a possible strategy profile containing σi}. (3)
In particular, there is a possible strategy profile σ′ containing σi such that Ui(v, σ′) = m.
In order to establish that m = HKPi(v, σi), it suffices to establish two things:
1. i knows that he gets at least m when playing strategy σi;
2. i does not know whether he gets any payoff greater than m.
Property 1 is secured since i knows that he gets at least his maximin payoff m when playing
strategy σi. In order to establish 2, consider any payoff q > m. Then player i cannot know
that i gets q when playing strategy σi since there is a possible strategy profile σ
′ containing
σi which brings payoff m, m < q. 2
Corollary 1 The highest known payoff HKPi(v, σi) is always known to player i.
Proof. Indeed, as an intelligent player, i knows Theorem 2 and is capable of computing
his maximin value (3) which is equal to HKPi(v, σi). 2
Another way of proving Corollary 1 by referring to general properties of knowledge was
used in [1].
The epistemic role of the Highest Known Payoff of a strategy can be illustrated by
Figure 4. For each node v, player i, and strategy σi of i, the (finite) set of all possible
payoffs for i divides naturally into two intervals.
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•
OO
HKPi(v, σi)
payoffs known to i as secured by σi
payoffs known to i as not necessarily secured by σi
Figure 4: Highest Known Payoff of a strategy
Interval 1: {p | p ≤ HKPi(v, σi)}. For each payoff p from this interval, player i knows
that he will get at least p when playing σi from v .
Interval 2: {q | q > HKPi(v, σi)}. For each payoff q from this interval, player i knows
that if he plays σi, then his opponents have response strategies which i cannot rule out to
the best of his knowledge and which bring i a payoff strictly less than q. So payoff q is
known to i as not necessarily secured by strategy σi.
Definition 1 The Highest Known Payoff of a move M at a node v, HKPi(v,M), is the
maximum of Highest Known Payoffs of strategies that start with move M at v:
HKPi(v,M) = max{HKPi(v, σi) | for all strategies σi making move M at v}.
It is clear that HKPi(v,M) is known to i and attainable when i plays strategy σi which
realizes the maximum of HKPi(v, σi)’s.
2.5 Best Known Strategy/Move
Definition 2 Strategy σi is a best known strategy for player i at a given node v if σi
has the greatest highest known payoff among all i’s strategies, i.e.,
HKPi(v, σ
′
i) ≤ HKPi(v, σi)
for all i’s strategies σ′i.
The best known strategy is not necessarily unique even for generic games, e.g., if strate-
gies differ at some node which is not accessible during the game, then these strategies are
different but apparently yield the same payoff under each response strategy and hence have
the same HKP. However, if we limit our attention to the first move of a strategy, then
we come to the notion of the best known move for a given player at a given node, which
is already unique for generic games. This notion reflects the idea of a definitive rational
choice.
9
Definition 3 A move M for player i at a node v is the best known move if it is the
first move of a best known strategy for i at v.
Equivalently, the best known move is that which has the greatest HKP, cf. Definition 1
and [1].
Theorem 3 [1] At each node v of a generic game, there exists a unique best known move.
Proof. Let i be the player who makes a move at v. Existence follows from the fact that
for each strategy σi, there is a well-defined highest known payoff HKPi(v, σi). To prove
uniqueness, note that best known strategies are those which have the greatest HKPi(v, σi),
which is, of course, unique for i at node v, by definition. We claim that all best known
strategies at a given node of a generic game start with the same move. Indeed, if two
strategies start with different moves in the game tree, they have disjoint sets of terminal
nodes and hence disjoint sets of payoffs for a given player. Such strategies could not have
the same HKP. 2
2.6 Highest Known Payoff at a node
Definition 4 The Highest Known Payoff for player i at a node v, HKPi(v), is the maxi-
mum of HKPi(v, σi)’s for all strategies σi by i:
HKPi(v) = max{HKPi(v, σi) | for all strategies σi by i}.
Naturally, HKPi(v) equals HKPi(v, σi) for the best known strategy σi at v.
Figure 5 shows that HKPi(v) separates two intervals.
•

OO
HKPi(v)
payoffs known to be secured by some strategy
payoffs which have no justified strategies for reaching them
Figure 5: Highest Known Payoff at a node
Interval 1: {p | p ≤ HKPi(v)}. These payoffs are known to i to be secured by a certain
strategy, and i knows exactly which strategy to use to secure these payoffs.
Interval 2: {q | q > HKPi(v)}. Neither of the payoffs from this region has a justified
strategy for player i to secure this payoff. Unless the game description says otherwise, i
cannot rationally expect more than the maximin payoff HKPi(v) at node v.
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2.7 Knowledge meets maximin
Theorem 2 shows that the maximin solution among all strategies the player deems possible
indeed corresponds to the highest known payoff to the best of player’s knowledge.
Our analysis of knowledge and rationality in deterministic perfect information games
can be summarized by the following two principles, which we accept as basic postulates of
the KBR-model (cf. [1] for a more detailed analysis).
Rationality Postulates:
I. A rational player chooses a maximin solution over all strategies of others which the
player deems possible.
II. Postulate (I) is commonly known and accepted by rational players.
Postulate I is the epistemically explicit form of Harsanyi’s Maximin Postulate. Likewise,
(II) is merely Harsanyi’s Mutually Expected Rationality Postulate expressed in epistemic
language.
As a corollary of Theorem 2, Rationality Postulate I can be equivalently formulated as
I′. A rational player chooses a move with the best known payoff.
For the rest of the paper, we will be using Postulates I and I′ interchangeably.
2.8 Knowledge-based rational decision method
A decision method for a certain class of games is a recipe for choosing moves at game nodes.
There are several well-known decision methods used for perfect information games: Nash
equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium, backward induction solution, pure maximin,
(iterated) elimination of dominated strategies, etc. A decision method is knowledge-based
if decisions are made exclusively on the basis of a player’s knowledge at the moment of
making this decision. In particular, since none of the factors other than knowledge is
explicitly given in the description of perfect information games, we assume that all rational
players are making knowledge-based decisions. In such a case, we expect epistemic states
of players to be sufficiently specified, otherwise the game is considered under-defined.
Definition 5 The knowledge-based rational decision (KBR) method chooses a move with
the best known payoff at each node.
Theorem 4 is the principal result of KBR-theory ([1]).
Theorem 4 [1] Any generic perfect information game with rational players and arbitrary
epistemic states of players has a unique KBR solution.
Proof. At any node of any such game, there is a unique best known move which is known
to the player who makes a decision. By Rationality Postulate I′, the player moves accord-
ingly. 2
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3 Uniqueness of knowledge-based rationality
The goal of Section 2 has been to argue that in perfect information games, with their finite
game trees and deterministic payoffs and no other assumptions for making a decision, the
KBR decision method of choosing a move with the best known payoff at each node coincides
with the epistemic form of Harsanyi’s Maximin Postulate.
A decision method is definitive for a certain class of games if it provides a unique choice
of action (move) at each node of every generic game in this class. This condition rules out
speculative ‘solutions’ such as ‘all moves are rational,’ etc.
In this Section, we compare KBR with other decision methods and show that KBR is
the only definitive method of playing perfect information games which is consistent with
Rationality Postulates I and II. A decision method is knowledge-based rational if its choice
of action (move) is consistent with Rationality Postulates I and II.
3.1 Uniqueness Theorem
Theorem 5 [KBR Theorem] For perfect information games, knowledge-based rational
decision is the only decision method which is definitive and knowledge-based rational.
Before we proceed with proving this theorem, consider some examples of decision methods.
1. Nash equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium;
2. Backward induction solution;
3. Pure maximin;
4. Eliminating dominated strategies.
3.2 Nash equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium
Nash equilibrium for extensive form games (cf. [15]) is neither definitive, nor rational, nor
knowledge-based. First, we notice that Nash equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium
are calculated on the basis of a game tree without taking into account epistemic states of
players. Therefore, we should not expect either to be based on knowledge.
Consider Game Three in Figure 6.
1, 2
•

A
0, 0
•

B
// // 2, 1//
Figure 6: Game Three
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There are two Nash equilibria in this game: {acrossA, acrossB} and {downA, downB} which
allow A to move either way, hence this method is not definitive.
Neither of these equilibria is uniformly rational. Indeed, if A knows that B is rational,
A’s rational choice is across since A knows that B will then play across and deliver a payoff
of 2 to A. Therefore, the second of the equilibria, {downA, downB}, is not rational for A.
If A does not know that B is rational, then A considers both moves by B possible and, by
Rationality Postulate I, A should play down. In this case, equilibrium {acrossA, acrossB}
is not rational for A.
Subgame perfect equilibrium (cf. [15]) when applied to Game Three eliminates equilib-
rium {downA, downB}, which is the only rational solution for A if A considers both moves
by B possible. Hence this method is not necessarily rational either.
3.3 Backward induction
The backward induction solution is rational and knowledge-based, but not definitive. More-
over, backward induction is a method of avoiding uncertainty by calculating opponents’
strategies. In particular, backward induction does not provide answers under uncertainty.
In Game Three, if A knows that B is rational, then the backward induction solution is
{acrossA, acrossB}. However, if B is rational, but A does not know this and considers both
moves by B possible, then backward induction does not work, thus leaving A without any
recommendation at all.
However, the backward induction solution, when it exists, coincides with the KBR-
solution. To make this claim precise, let us use the standard common knowledge require-
ment for backward induction.
Theorem 6 In perfect information generic games, common knowledge of rationality yields
the backward induction solution which coincides with the KBR-solution.
Proof. Indeed, backward induction reasoning yields that at each node, the corresponding
player knows the actual strategy used by his opponents from this node onwards. There
is no uncertainty at any node. Naturally, both backward induction and KBR choose the
same uniquely determined rational move. 2
3.4 Pure maximin
Pure maximin is not necessarily rational. In Game Three, if A knows that B is rational,
then A’s best strategy is acrossA and this strategy is known by A to bring him a payoff of
2. The pure maximin solution downA brings A payoff 1 and hence is not rational.
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3.5 Eliminating dominated strategies
Eliminating dominated strategies is an epistemically correct method which, however, is not
definitive. We refer the reader to [15] for exact definitions and restrict our attention here
to an example.
In Game Three, where A considers both moves by B possible, neither of A’s strategies,
acrossA and downA, is dominated and hence cannot be eliminated. Therefore, eliminating
dominated strategies alone does not provide a definitive answer here.
However, if eliminating dominated strategies provides a definitive answer, the remaining
strategy yields the KBR solution.
3.6 Proof of the KBR Theorem
Proof. Fix a generic game and a node v. The KBR-method consists of choosing the move
which yields the highest known payoff for a given player i at v, HKPi(v). Such a move
exists and is unique (Theorem 3).
Suppose i has to make a move at v and chooses a unique moveM. Let m be the highest
payoff which i knows is secured by M. By Theorem 3, there is a unique such m.
Case 1. m = HKPi(v). Then M is the KBR choice since for generic games, by
Theorem 3, different moves have different HKP’s.
Case 2. m < HKPi(v). Choosing M contradicts Rationality Postulate I′ since M is
not the best known move for i at v. Indeed, the best known move at v corresponds to
HKPi(v), which is different from m.
Case 3. m > HKPi(v). This case is impossible, by definition of HKPi(v). Indeed, the
highest payoff m which i knows is secured by move M cannot be higher than the highest
known payoff at v. 2
4 Relationships to Aumann’s model of rationality
In this section, we compare the KBR model (which may be called Harsanyi/KBR rational-
ity) with Aumann’s knowledge-related model of rationality [3].
Aumann’s rationality has been mathematically formalized in set-theoretical Aumann
structures, and we refer the reader to [3]. The verbal account of Aumann’s rationality has
been summarized in [3] as follows:
“... call i rational at v if there is no strategy that i knows would have yielded
him a conditional payoff at v larger than that which in fact he gets.”
The mathematical formulation of Aumann’s rationality considers irrational any choice
by i of a strategy σi in a situation when i knows that there is another strategy σ
′
i which
strictly dominates σi. All strategies which are not irrational are considered rational.
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This definition of rationality works well when uncertainty at a node can be completely
resolved by epistemic reasoning, e.g., under common knowledge of rationality in perfect
information games, or when the player knows that one strategy strictly dominates all others.
However, Aumann’s rationality does not help to make decisions in general situations, e.g.,
when there is a choice of several strategies, none of which strictly dominates the others.
For example, in Game One (Apollo 13 Dilemma in Figure 1), Aumann’s approach
considers rational both strategies by A, down and across, since neither dominates the other.
However, as we have already discussed in the Introduction, the intuitive solution down is
well-justified and supported by both Harasnyi’s Maximin Postulate and its epistemic form,
the KBR-method.
In Game Two (Figure 3) and Game Three (Figure 6), when A is not aware of B’s
rationality, Aumann’s approach again considers rational both strategies by A, down and
across, and does not give a definitive solution, whereas there is a unique KBR-solution
down.
Likewise, in the Centipede game, when players are not aware of each other’s rationality,
Aumann’s definition considers rational any move at nodes 1–4, which does not lead to a
solution.
On the other hand, however, Aumann’s approach is consistent with that of KBR.
Proposition 2 Any KBR-rational strategy is Aumann-rational, but not vice versa.
Proof. A KBR-rational strategy σi yields the highest known payoff at a given node v.
Therefore, there cannot be another strategy σ′i about which player i knows that σ
′
i strictly
dominates σi since otherwise,
HKPi(v, σ
′
i) > HKPi(v, σi)
and hence σi cannot be KBR-rational.
Examples of Games One, Two, and Three show that there are Aumann-rational strate-
gies which are not KBR-rational. 2
Finally, if Aumann’s rationality yields a definitive answer, then this answer is the KBR-
solution. In this respect, KBR-rationality may be regarded as a definitive extension of
Aumann’s rationality.
5 Discussion
5.1 Logic of Knowledge
As in [1], we base our informal reasoning on the properties of knowledge using the principles
of modal logic S5, which is the standard choice for Game Theory (cf. [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11,
15, 18, 19] and many others). In particular, knowledge modalitiesKP satisfy the postulates
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Axioms and rules of classical logic;
KP (F → G) ∧KP (F )→ KP (G), epistemic closure principle;
KP (F )→ F, factivity;
KP (F )→ KPKP (F ), positive introspection;
¬KP (F )→ KP (¬KP (F )), negative introspection;
Necessitation Rule: if F is derived without hypothesis, then KP (F ) is also derived.
5.2 Manipulation by leaking true information
Tracking epistemic states of players helps to describe and study learning in games and
manipulation by controlling information flow.
Consider the following game tree in Figure 7.
•






/
//
//
//
//
//
/
•
 






A
2, 1, 4
•






/
//
//
//
//
//
/C
?
??
??
??
??
??
??
4, 2, 2
B
3, 4, 3 1, 3, 1
Figure 7: Game Four
In Game Four, A is not aware of B’s and C’s rationality. The KBR solution suggests
A’s choosing left to secure payoff 2. Actually, A gets 4 which is more than expected since
B will play left. Payoff for B, as well as for C, is 2.
Suppose also that B and C are smart enough to understand this. B can then manipulate
A by leaking the true information that C is rational. A then knows that C will play left,
rationally plays right and gets payoff 3 which is what A expected. B’s and C’s payoffs are
4 and 3 respectively, both higher than before. C does not have an incentive to disclose to
A that B is rational as well, and B wins without ever making a move!
This example demonstrates an interesting principle: more knowledge yields a higher
known payoff but not necessarily a higher actual payoff. So ‘nothing but the truth’ can be
misleading. Knowing ‘the whole truth’ however, yields a higher actual payoff.
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5.3 Relaxing rationality conditions
Of course, there are better ways to play the Centipede game, e.g., if some of the conditions
of Theorem 1 are relaxed.
Game Five. Consider a version of the Centipede game in Figure 2 in which A decides
to make one irrational move across at node 5, and this, along with rationality of players
at all other nodes, is commonly known. Then both players choose across at all nodes, A’s
payoff is 4, and B’s payoff is 5. Indeed, by assumption, A plays across at 5. At node 4,
B knows that A will play across at 5, hence B rationally plays across at 4 as well. B’s
reasoning is known to A, hence A plays across at 3, etc.
Game Six. Player B decides to move across at node 4 (and this, along with the ratio-
nality of players at all other nodes, is commonly known). A then plays down at node 5 and
secures payoff 5 for himself and payoff 3 for B. By assumption, B plays across at node 4.
A knows this and plays across at node 3 after rationally choosing payoff 5 over payoff 3.
Similarly, B plays across at 2 since B’s payoff is then equal to 3, which is higher than B’s
payoff 2. Finally, A chooses across at 1 to secure his payoff 5 and hence B’s payoff 3.
The aforementioned solutions of Games Five and Six are KBR-solutions, which also can
be regarded as backward induction solutions given common knowledge of specific irrational
moves by players.
5.4 Introducing probabilities
Game Seven. Player A can do even better if he is allowed to play probabilistically. Suppose,
in Figure 2, at node 5, A plays across with probability 0.51 and down with probability 0.49,
and this, along with the rationality of players at all other nodes, is commonly known. Then
B’s expected payoff when playing across at node 4 is 4.02 which is a higher payoff than
playing down at node 4. So B rationally chooses across at 4. Likewise, A’s expected payoff
at node 3 when playing across is 4.49, which is higher than his payoff of down at node 3.
Therefore, A plays across at 3. The same reasoning justifies playing across at nodes 1 and
2 as well. As a result, both players play across at nodes 1–4, and A tosses a 0.51/0.49 coin
at node 5. The average payoff for A is 4.49 (and can be made arbitrary close to 4.5 by
playing with ‘almost’ 0.5 probability at node 5) and the average payoff for B is 4.02.
This solution may be regarded as an example of probabilistic KBR-reasoning that is
yet to be worked out in detail. The example shows that if players have reliable information
about a priori probabilities of other players’ strategies, they can do considerably better
than following a pure KBR solution which, in this example, would still suggest playing
down at each node9.
Another possibility is allowing a player to make a probabilistic assessment of uncer-
tainty s/he faces; in particular, of the strategy choices made by the other players. Such
9Such a gap between pure and probabilistic KBR reasoning was anticipated by A. Brandenburger in a
private communication.
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an epistemic approach has been studied within a framework of belief-based interactive
epistemology, cf. a survey [7].
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